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 Abstract: This article introduces the special issue as a whole, takes stock of the extant 
historiography on urban societies in Europe since 1945, and proposes elements of a synthetic 
interpretation. In so doing, it foregrounds long-term continuities while also considering short-
term shifts – especially regarding the immediate post-war years and the planning modernism of 
the 1960s – argues that the differences between ‘Western Europe’ and ‘Eastern Bloc’ should not 
be overstated and suggests a reflective engagement with urban sociology and urban studies. The 
article ends with the thesis that ‘the quest for urban coherence’ (Thomas Bender) needs to be 
taken seriously as a central feature of the period from 1945 to the end of the Cold War.
How can we write the history of urban societies in Europe after 1945? This article offers an 
interpretative overview of key developments in both eastern and western Europe, while also 
discussing some key conceptual issues. Along the way, it takes stock of the relevant 
historiography (much of which is very recent) and introduces a selection of papers from a cycle 
of three international workshops held between 2011 and 2013.1 The papers range geographically 
from Britain to the Soviet Union and cover topics as diverse as post-war reconstruction and 
alternative communities in the 1970s. Their respective approaches are informed by an interest in 
the way societies have been imagined in discourses and reshaped in spatial settings. Moreover, 
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the papers move beyond case studies, urban history’s classic genre, and can therefore facilitate 
synthetic reflection. It is our hope that, in so doing, we can make urban history more relevant to 
contemporary European historians in general. 
Cities are central to the history of European societies after 1945. Between the 1950s and 
the 1970s, the eastern, southern and south eastern parts of the continent underwent rapid and 
massive urbanisation. In western and northern Europe, suburbanisation led to the growth of 
conurbations rather than cities, but this trend never went as far as in the United States, and was in 
fact soon counterbalanced by a reinvigoration of many inner-city neighbourhoods. Urban spaces 
were a crucial testing ground for government planners, welfare practitioners and commercial 
developers. They were sites of political protest in 1968 and 1989, as well as during the uprisings 
against communist rule in the 1950s and the protests against urban redevelopment in the 1970s 
and 1980s. They attracted intense attention from the media, which focused on poor and 
ethnically diverse ‘problem’ areas, new ‘alternative’ spaces and the lives of ‘ordinary’ people. 
Moreover, after the wartime and post-war hardships, millions of urbanites or suburbanites 
developed and pursued their own preferences in a more favourable context and with government 
support, including to some extent in the Eastern Bloc. Thus, different forces were involved in 
redefining and reshaping European cities, leading to varied outcomes. Present-day urban 
societies, although preferring to commemorate their more ancient pasts, bear witness to this 
complicated recent history, just as they are experiencing further and no less dramatic changes.
These crucial developments have hitherto not been sufficiently researched and 
conceptualised; neither have they been incorporated into interpretations and narratives of 
European history since 1945. Modern urban history still tends to concentrate on the nineteenth 
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and early twentieth centuries. While this is beginning to change, the predominance of studies set 
in particular cities and a frequent focus on municipal planning leave broader issues of social and 
cultural history underexplored. In turn, contemporary European historians have thus far not 
shown great interest in cities. This is evident in the available surveys, which concentrate either 
on political and intellectual history or offer broad-sweep surveys of social trends.2 What both 
approaches leave out is the micro-level of societies, particularly how they were shaped in spatial 
settings. Furthermore, surveys of social trends pay scant attention to the ways in which societies 
were represented and imagined – cultural processes which influenced urban policies and thus had 
demonstrable social effects. Finally, broad-sweep histories of societal ‘Europeanisation’ (such as 
Hartmut Kaelble’s) tend to underrate the complexity of European societies in the plural, which 
could assume very different shapes depending on their location in space and time. Urban 
histories can thus serve as useful correctives as well as important building blocks for a future 
social and cultural history of contemporary Europe  that is more complex and  diverse.
This said, several recent attempts at synthesising the urban history of twentieth-century 
Europe warrant mention. Leif Jerram’s Streetlife shows how major trends and shifts had tangible 
spatial repercussions, how dictatorial intervention repeatedly met with a certain resilience by 
urban societies and how women, consumers of culture and sexual minorities accessed, shaped or 
created the spaces they desired. A point of particular relevance to the period since 1945 is 
Jerram’s qualified yet spirited defence of the often derided planners and architects, who, he 
argues, strove to fulfil a broad popular demand for domestic privacy.3 In a comparative article, 
Hartmut Kaelble has identified a number of ‘specificities of the European city in the twentieth 
century’, among which the following are especially important here: limited urban growth, the 
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influence of planners and municipal governments, the significance of an older urban past and the 
strong attachment to central areas as residential spaces, which were consequently preserved and 
revitalised from the 1970s.4 Kaelble’s bird’s-eye view results in an aggregated picture of ‘the 
European city’ as a site of cohesion, continuity and managed change. While this is certainly 
defensible in comparison to other regions of the world, the final chapters in Friedrich Lenger’s 
comprehensive Metropolen der Moderne are more attentive to intra-European differences such as 
that between Western European suburbanisation and the greater density of cities in the Eastern 
Bloc. Moreover, Lenger displays a sharper sense than Kaelble for historically contingent changes 
such as the unexpectedly rapid recovery of urban societies from wartime destruction, the 
subsequent advent of mass immigration and the emergence of various protest movements in East 
and West alike.5
Lenger’s sense for contingency is shared by the contributions to this special issue. In the 
late 1940s, extant plans notwithstanding, it was difficult to predict just how fundamentally 
European cities were to change over the subsequent two decades. In turn, hardly any observers 
around 1960 anticipated that the significance of an older urban past and the attachment to central 
areas, rightly stressed by Kaelble, would soon become such a widely accepted principle, to an 
extent even in the Eastern Bloc. Explaining these transformations and shifts is only possible if 
broader discourses pertaining to cities and a variety of groups attempting to shape them are taken 
into account. In so doing, we attempt to historicise rather than condemn the attitudes of planners, 
architects and government officials, as suggested by Jerram, while also including those of urban 
sociologists, intellectuals and activists. These attitudes had very ‘real’ consequences, which is 
why historians of urban societies need to take them seriously. In addition to introducing the 
4
individual articles, the following sections offer some clues towards an overarching narrative that 
is both specifically urban and more broadly relevant to social and cultural historians. It is 
attentive to diversity and contingency while integrating the growing volume of detailed 
information and literature. The first two sections treat either side of the Iron Curtain, with an eye 
on both differences and commonalities, beginning with ‘the West’; the third section offers a more 
methodological discussion of different approaches to the study of urban societies since 1945.  
I.
An integrated yet complex narrative of Western European urban societies since 1945 needs to 
begin with a reconsideration of the immediate post-war years. The period can certainly be 
viewed as marked by a reversal of urbanisation, due to the terrible human and material toll of the 
Second World War and the subsequent breakdown of infrastructure and provision. But it is 
perhaps more apt to speak of a particular type of urban society. This urban society was, firstly, 
characterised by an individualism that often blurred the lines between crime and legitimate self-
help, as the prominence of black marketeering shows.6 The post-war years were, secondly, a 
period of intense historical awareness. Precisely because the discontinuities in the urban 
experience were so marked and local cohesion so elusive, the attachment to the respective city’s 
past was strong. Hence the massive efforts to reconstruct, under most difficult conditions, 
buildings and squares that had been destroyed, without which Munich or Nuremberg would look 
very different today.7 Thirdly, older social groups and identities retained or even regained their 
importance, for much the same reasons. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, bourgeois elites, for 
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instance in Bremen, once again marshalled political power.8 A dense social fabric of artisans and 
shop-owners was still very much present in cities such as Toulouse, while left-wing culture even 
enjoyed a particular vibrancy, most prominently in the Paris of working-class neighbourliness 
and communist demonstrations.9  
The post-war years were thus not just an exceptional moment in European urban history, 
but can also be seen in a longer view. The relationship to architectural heritage as well as the 
presence of industrial workers, a self-employed lower middle class and bourgeois elites hark 
back to nineteenth-century cities.10 The spectre of black marketeering and crime, often depicted 
in anti-Semitic terms, as well as the emergence of what has been aptly labelled a ‘self-help 
society’, are familiar from the period after 1918.11 Conversely, these features did not just 
disappear in the subsequent decades. To cite but one example, shantytowns on the fringes of 
French cities existed into the 1970s. Civil society constitutes another long-term continuity, 
including the neighbourhood associations that played such an important role in the transition 
from the Franco and Salazar dictatorships to democracy or the active civic engagement in 
suburban England.12        
To point out often overlooked continuities does not mean minimising the far-reaching 
transformation which western European cities underwent in the 1950s and 1960s – far beyond 
cities such as Coventry or Rotterdam, where reconstruction was anyway closely linked to 
modernisation. In a period of relative affluence, public and private investment was possible to an 
extent unprecedented for half a century, while construction became cheaper due to new materials 
and technologies. The pressing problems of the interwar years that had been impossible to 
address during the 1940s did not disappear, but their solution came increasingly within reach. 
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Social housing was built on a massive scale, offering millions of urban dwellers access to central 
heating and indoor bathrooms. In poorer countries with rudimentary welfare states, such as 
Spain, the outlook of many cities was still drastically changed by commercial developers. Road 
systems were expanded to accommodate the rapidly growing number of cars. This 
transformation of entire cityscapes enjoyed widespread support, and – in more affluent countries 
such as West Germany, the Netherlands, France or Britain – was driven by government planners 
alongside architects and developers.
The attitudes and actions of this crucial group need to be placed in broader social and 
cultural contexts. From such a vantage point, the planners’ relationship to western Europe’s 
urban past was more ambivalent than is often acknowledged. On the one hand, they were bent on 
clearing away a nineteenth-century architectural heritage that was now deemed a burden to the 
development of cities. They strove to overcome the traces of wartime destruction and saw 
themselves as working towards a classless society. On the other hand, this modernist mindset can 
be seen as a continuation of the nineteenth-century tension between ease of circulation (with 
regard to road-building for car drivers) and civilising ambition (for instance with respect to the 
stability promised by new housing developments).13 Moreover, as Tim Verlaan demonstrates in 
the present issue for the Netherlands, planners harboured severe doubts about change, out of both 
an attachment to the urban past and what the author identifies as an early form of ‘reflexive 
modernisation’. They felt as if they were faced with a juggernaut that they could at best hope to 
slow down and control – a thesis that challenges received wisdom about unqualified modernist 
optimism, but chimes with recent studies of planners in the United Kingdom.14
7
However we assess the mindset of architects, planners and officials in the 1960s, it is 
crucial to note that they reacted to wider currents and pressures. The notion of authoritarian 
‘technocrats’ imposing their one-sided views on the urban fabric is much repeated by scholars 
who are, perhaps for good reason, critical towards the planners’ agendas. But it obscures the 
extent to which democratically elected governments responded to a broad demand for 
domesticity, automobility and consumption, as historians of English or French cities have already 
been pointing out for some time and as Verlaan argues in this issue.15 In turn, this responsiveness 
partly explains why the transformation of western European urbanity did not go further than it 
did. After all, plans for a second motorway in Paris on the left bank of the Seine were eventually 
scrapped; in the Federal Republic of Germany urban centres retained far more public transport, 
leisure and shopping facilities than in the United States; in Belgium, the absence of planning led 
to a dispersal of newly built single-family homes that corresponded to their owners’ preferences 
– even if it caused a renowned modernist architect to speak of ‘the ugliest country in the 
world’.16
Furthermore, one should not underestimate the substantial criticism of the collaboration 
between municipal governments and commercial developers. This criticism stemmed from 
intellectual traditions as well as from a strong attachment to the urban past, to established social 
identities and familiar ways of life. This was a real staple of 1960s culture, for instance in the 
song Il ragazzo della Via Gluck (‘The Boy of Gluck Street’, 1966), in which Adriano Celentano 
waxes nostalgic about a ramshackle street on the outskirts of Milan that had been home to poor 
southern Italian immigrants but was now entirely built up. Such criticism could be politically 
harmless, but was taken up by communists where capitalism could be blamed, for instance in 
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Toulouse or Le Havre.17 By the end of the 1960s it fuelled often massive discontent, which 
discouraged commercial developers and municipal authorities from some of their demolition 
projects in Franco’s Madrid and the Gaullist government from the construction of yet more large-
scale housing developments on the fringes of major French cities.18 
The rapid paradigm change from urban modernisation to urban preservation around 1970 
remains puzzling, but it is, again, somewhat easier to account for when placed in a broader social 
and cultural context. Several contributions to the present issue offer elements of an explanation. 
Like Verlaan, Moritz Föllmer contends that what appears to be a strong consensus was rather 
fragile in the first place. He demonstrates how New Left activists after 1968 politicised pre-
existing doubts about the whole notion of personal choice that had previously underpinned the 
development of road networks, apartment buildings and suburban homes. Christiane Reinecke 
points to the increasing attention that sociologists and journalists paid to stubborn zones of urban 
poverty. At international conferences and in media reports, they questioned not only the actual 
success of modernisation policies but increasingly also the prospect of creating a classless 
society. Already by the late 1960s social democracy as a pan-western European and 
predominantly urban force began to show signs of wear and tear, as Natasha Vall demonstrates 
for Newcastle. In the north-east of England, the project of creating an ‘integrated industrial 
modernity’ drew strongly on Swedish models, which, however, proved unsuitable in a different 
social context and soon met with the new problem of mass unemployment.  
The even less explored urban history of the 1970s and 1980s stands out by the co-
existence of a number of seemingly paradoxical trends. While the shift towards the suburbs was 
still continuing, many middle-class residents rediscovered central areas as residential spaces. 
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Modernisation projects in the 1960s vein were surreptitiously pursued, pushed through against 
mounting protests or neglected almost upon completion. Urban activism became far more 
important, ranging from the ultimately pragmatic quest for basic housing and infrastructural 
provision in Lisbon to the minoritarian but influential search for ‘alternative’ spaces and 
subjectivities in West Berlin, Amsterdam or Zurich, here analysed by Föllmer.19 In the 1950s and 
1960s women had been consigned to the domestic sphere by both Christian and Social 
Democrats (which corresponded, Leif Jerram insists, to the desires and interests of most of 
them). But now they became more visible, as feminist groups publicised concerns about sexual 
violence and generally pushed for a more gender-equal city. Ethnic minorities, previously kept 
out of central areas and ignored by urban planners,20 did not just grow in number but began to 
change the face of cities such as Birmingham, Rotterdam or Frankfurt. Working-class urbanites 
were increasingly pushed to the margins of deindustrialising economies and societies, reinforcing 
the divide between Glasgow, Dortmund or Bilbao on the one hand and Bordeaux, Munich or 
Amsterdam on the other, while also transforming cities with more mixed economies such as 
London, Cologne or Stockholm.21 Faced with these multiple challenges, municipal governments 
began to edge towards ‘softer’ priorities. They attempted simultaneously to appeal to more 
diverse constituencies and foster civic unity through an emphasis on green spaces, historic 
buildings, cultural institutions and public events, all the while striving to attract investors, 
tourists and national or European funding.22 By the end of the Cold War, urban ‘western Europe’ 
had acquired far greater complexity than could have been imagined in the 1950s and 1960s.23
II.
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The complexity and diversity of the western European experience was matched by that of Europe 
as a whole. Important parts of Europe’s history in this period transcended the Iron Curtain: 
differences in ideology or development did not generate entirely contrasting urban experiences in 
East and West. For sure, ‘western Europe’ and ‘eastern Europe’ were real places. They were 
geographical artefacts that actually existed (notwithstanding Finnish, Greek and Czechoslovak 
outliers). They had their own political and economic characteristics. After all, for most of our 
period, the countries of western Europe were usually capitalist democracies and those of the east 
were communist dictatorships. And while transnational links between East and West were of 
crucial significance in both blocs,24 some urban environments, especially in cities that were 
closed to foreigners for military or strategic reasons, were shaped much more by curiosity about 
the West than by actual knowledge.25 Yet research has repeatedly shown that a straightforward 
division between East and West seems to be an unsustainable framework for conceptualising the 
urban history of Europe since 1945.
 At no point was this more apparent than during the post-war emergency. In some senses, 
it would be invidious to generalise too much about the comparative extent of urban poverty, 
malnutrition and disease, or the relative impact of physical destruction on either side of the Iron 
Curtain. Rotterdam, for instance, was wrecked by famine and bombing; the British Labour Party 
was elected in summer 1945 precisely in order to remedy a moral crisis of poverty and social 
injustice that was given voice during the war, and was most obvious in the cities. But urban 
devastation was plainly more common in those areas affected by Nazi-Soviet conflict. This 
extended to cities beyond the reach of the fighting, which were subject to overcrowding, the 
chronic neglect of infrastructure and severe economic dislocation. Here epidemics spread and 
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filth was endemic.26 Both in the Soviet Union and in the new or emerging communist 
dictatorships of its western hinterland, urban societies had been disordered, wrecked and only 
partly remade. Urban populations in the East found themselves with little choice but to pursue 
some of the same survival strategies as their comparators in the West: no government – in East or 
West – was capable of designing and implementing wholesale urban reconstruction in the 
immediate wake of 1945. Instead, individual urban dwellers, acting alone, or at varying levels of 
spontaneous organisation, played a very major role in the slow recovery of urban conditions. In 
the East, in recognition of state incapacity, party and government initiatives were sometimes 
designed to maximise the usefulness of individuals’ autonomous participation. It was understood 
that people were thereby contributing not only to the survival of themselves and their families, 
but also to the emerging recovery of their society. All this was true not just in places that were 
devastated by fighting or occupation, but also in zones well to the rear, as Robert Dale argues in 
this issue.
 What this suggests is that there were limits to the capacity not only of state-directed 
resources but also of dominant political ideologies to determine the course of urban life in Cold 
War Europe. Policymakers and planners in East and West alike had to find practical solutions 
that were consistent with ideological prescriptions, but which stretched the boundaries of 
ideological purity. The resulting bureaucratic tensions, richly documented in archives, have been 
one of the most fruitful areas of recent historical inquiry.27 Property law was a good example of 
how official policy incorporated the demands of practical reality. It facilitated individual self-
reliance, notwithstanding the ideological preference for collectivism. In order to cope with the 
urban emergency, a Soviet decree of 1944 made it easier for ordinary urbanites to borrow funds, 
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obtain building materials and access building plans, in order to construct a small, separate house 
that they would then own themselves according to the tenure of personal property (a kind of 
medium-term leasehold). In the late 1950s, as much as one third of urban housing construction 
was ascribed to this genuine form of individual ownership. By the early 1960s, in an atmosphere 
of Khrushchev-era Leninist idealism, personal property was being marginalised in Soviet cities 
in favour of cooperative apartments, but these also rested on a combination of individual savings 
and state credit.28 Analogous tenurial arrangements could be found throughout the Eastern Bloc. 
In Yugoslavia, individual housing, seen by many urban dwellers as a cheaper option than 
apartments, was a source of anxious controversy among planners.29 The situation was 
particularly striking in Hungary. In the so-called Family House Debate of 1960–61, architects 
and ordinary people explored the advantages of individual housing as opposed to the mass 
construction of apartment blocks.30 Even in the late 1970s, 60 per cent of housing construction 
there fell within the individual sector.31
 Such houses were only one of the urban locations in which citizens of the Eastern Bloc 
created their own forms of privacy and private life. Almost immediately following the bloc’s  
collapse, social scientists and cultural studies experts started to imagine the socialist city as a 
complex web of public and private space,32 and historians soon borrowed the approach.33 If 
staking out personal space was no less important than in the capitalist cities of the West, it  
required more effort and imagination. For sure, privacy was challenged by the collective rituals 
that were one of the functions of communist urban space, and by the acute shortage of housing. 
But people found privacy in overcrowded apartments and even in workers’ barracks. For much of 
the post-Stalin period, in most places, the law did not seek actively to reduce urbanites’ access to 
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private space. In a wide-ranging survey of private life in the German Democratic Republic, Paul 
Betts draws attention, for example, to the ways that the arbitration of neighbourhood disputes in 
East Berlin facilitated the protection of individual space, admittedly in a socialist idiom.34
 By the 1970s and 1980s dissidents would decry their fellow-citizens’ retreat to private 
life. During this period, Eastern Bloc cities (outside Poland) were not arenas for much political 
dissent, but they were places that accommodated ‘deviant’ and marginal interests and lifestyles, 
ranging across sexuality, underground cultures and even hippy groups.35 Yet private and public, 
marginal and mainstream, were not antagonistic concepts in the Eastern Bloc city. Urbanites 
constantly reconciled them in ways that were locally and temporally specific, but which were 
also typical of the ways that people live and think in modern cities. Thus Alexei Yurchak argues 
that an urbane 1980s Komsomol official could believe in important parts of the Soviet project 
while spending much of his free time acquiring and listening to bootlegged cassettes of Western 
rock groups.36
 If urban societies in the Eastern Bloc were notable, therefore, for the fluid ways in which   
official rules and unofficial realities blended together, they were still the metropolitan zones of 
communist dictatorships. Romania, for all its independent, pro-Western diplomacy in the 1970s, 
was the most statist in its planning, the most defiantly Eastern-Bloc in its architectural aesthetics. 
The infamous House of the People in central Bucharest, the third largest building in the world 
when it was constructed in the 1980s, is merely the most prominent example. It was in Romania 
that the actions of planners were most aggressive, demolishing huge numbers of traditional 
communities and replacing them with a limited number of urban forms.37 In a widely read British 
novel of 2011 about the Romanian revolution of 1989, a character explores communist Bucharest 
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with old guidebooks from the past: ‘We would cross the dark, cold, kitsch-marbled squares of 
Ceaușescu’s Bucharest using a map that told us we were in a bustling side street full of cafés and 
cabarets.’38 
 So there was a contrast between those urban phenomena that could most obviously be 
ascribed to universal developments – for the sake of simplicity, to modernisation – and those 
which were the particular consequences of either capitalist or communist ideology.39 For a start, 
the purpose of post-war urban recovery was plainly different in the cities of the East and those of 
the West. In the East, the aim was to build socialism, which for the first decade of the period 
(more in some places) meant constructing a Stalinist way of life. Stalinism transformed cities. It 
used violence to subordinate the interests of the countryside to those of the towns, often 
imposing agricultural collectivisation on an uncomprehending and hostile peasantry and thereby 
extracting capital from villages in order to pay for fast-paced and mass-scale urbanisation and 
industrialisation. Most striking were those cities that were built out of nothing and which existed 
to serve the interests of a single, massive industrial plant. A prototype was Nowa Huta, near 
Krakow, which became the Polish steel city. Roads, housing, hospitals, schools and shops were 
built in the immediate vicinity of the steelworks. The enterprise was responsible for industry, 
labour, infrastructure and social services of all types, including entertainment and leisure. And 
yet, even during the most intensely Stalinist period of its construction, it remained an urban 
environment to which in-migrants (many of them peasants) quickly adapted, in which they 
forged their own particular urban selves and which, for all the apparent oppressiveness of its 
domineering mission to rewrite the landscape, ultimately represented a compromise between 
ideology and reality.40
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 Meanwhile, such classically urban phenomena as consumerism and welfare were not only 
functions of Western cities. Historians of the Eastern Bloc have gone to great lengths to 
demonstrate that consumption shaped people’s lives as much as production, and that the 
advertisement, acquisition and use of consumer goods were among the most crucial dynamics of 
urban societies.41 Objects of desire, from the difficult-to-obtain car to the ubiquitous cigarette, 
created private arenas in public spaces and forced urban planners to imagine the socialist city in 
ways that did not always seem socialist.42 But these ways did begin to seem normal, and 
‘normalisation’ was precisely the label given to the socialist relaunch in Czechoslovakia after 
1968. Here, images of consumer goods in television series helped to construct people’s sense of 
the normality of their urban societies.43 But compared with ‘consumerism’, welfare was built 
into the physical structures of the Eastern Bloc city much more deeply than it was in the West: 
eastern European cities became welfare arenas in a far more thorough and extensive way than 
any of their western counterparts. As Mark B. Smith shows with reference to the Soviet Union, 
this was partly, though far from only, thanks to company towns (Nowa Huta was a Polish 
analogue): the giant industrial plants that were also, effectively, a whole city or city district, and 
which had responsibility for a formidable infrastructure of welfare. In terms of physical urban 
space, welfare included housing, a considerable proportion of which was owned by enterprises, 
as well as hospitals, polyclinics, schools, kindergartens and pensions offices. It extended into 
exurbia, where industrial enterprises and their associated trade unions owned pioneer camps, rest 
houses and sanatoria. The complexity and deliberate design of this urban and immediately 
exurban network of welfare was a distinctive feature of the communist dictatorships and did not 
have an immediate analogue in the West. 
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 Social welfare, therefore, arguably gave the socialist city its most socialist characteristics. 
But just as in the West, urban space was always contested territory. Its regulation and 
organisation brought individuals and social groups into dispute, while holding in awkward check 
the interests of the varied branches of central government, as well as municipality, party and 
population. Tension could take different forms. In Milan Kundera’s The Joke (1967), for 
example, it is true belief, working-class brutality and folk tradition that collide in a variety of 
urban and exurban settings in 1950s Czechoslovakia. Kundera’s message is that the oppressive 
state, the agent of totalitarianism, clumsily reorders the shape of urban space and the lives of 
urban dwellers, and ultimately they can do little about it, and if they express the wrong opinion, 
they will be destroyed. But urban space sculpted rights in particular if limited ways. These 
countries were dictatorships, and so most rights were absent or incoherent, but in the post-Stalin 
period these cities were nothing if not welfare arenas, partly modulated by socio-economic 
rights. The socio-economic, civil and property rights which constitutions promised to guarantee 
were experienced in particular urban spaces (far more so than in the countryside, which was 
rights-deprived even by the standards of the Eastern Bloc dictatorships). 
 A very ambiguous kind of civil society lurked in the shadow of existing rights. With its 
mass membership and its capacity to shape national debate, Solidarity in Poland was the gold-
starred example of civil society in the Communist East. There were other examples of groups 
which could legally exist, and, by the 1970s and 1980s, press their interests in debates with 
government. They were often formally semi-detached from the state but somehow autonomous 
from it, notably the Soviet veterans’ movement, the various national women’s organisations, the 
spontaneous and entirely non-statist environmentalist groups and (with particularly focused 
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interests on urban form) the Soviet All-Union Society for the Protection of Monuments of 
History and Culture (VOOPIiK).44 However, such groups scarcely influenced the course of city 
life in the way that millions of independent organisations did in western Europe. They were 
enmeshed into the system, but their independence was uncertain – and they could not reproduce 
themselves. Stephen Kotkin and Jan Gross argue in a trenchant account of the collapse of the 
Eastern Bloc that it was precisely the absence of civil society (with the exception of Poland) that 
facilitated the collapse of Communism: the system expired when ruling elites saw the chance to 
turn political power into vast fortunes, and there were no organisations of civil society to stop 
them.45 Ultimately, the urban societies of communist eastern Europe were more fragile than their 
counterparts in the West. Since 1989, cities in the former Eastern Bloc have come to terms with 
that fragility in diverse ways, from rampant privatisation and radical rezoning of formerly public 
space, to the survival of much of the old housing stock and the struggles of contested nostalgia.46
III. 
To bring different empirical studies together under the umbrella of ‘urban societies’ raises some 
important conceptual and methodological questions, although this theme issue can only address 
them to a limited extent. In the first instance, contemporary historians of urban Europe are faced 
with a body of relevant social thought, particularly with regard to the sociology of the city and of 
related themes such as migration or poverty. One tendency in recent years has been to historicise 
past sociological studies as primary sources. According to such a view, sociologists have 
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contributed crucially to the construction of society and have (as interviewers or participant 
observers) even taken part in social interactions.47 Therefore, they cannot provide us with an 
independent methodological vantage point; nor should their findings be taken as mere depictions 
of a ‘real’ society. Indeed, one could argue that some much-cited studies of the 1950s should be 
read against the backdrop of wider contemporary concerns about the cohesion of working-class 
families and neighbourhoods in the modernising city,48 while many subsequent ones were written 
by authors close to the urban protest movements of the 1970s.49 One might also point out that 
some more recent sociologists in Germany, for instance, have echoed rather than qualified 
worries about the putative disintegration of ‘the European city’, whereas others emphasise that 
the identity and agency of specific cities owes much to the language and imagery of urban 
marketing.50 Whether either view can usefully inform urban historians is debatable.   
 The issue of how to deal with the rich body of urban sociology and urban studies when 
historicising urban societies is approached in different ways in the present theme issue. 
Christiane Reinecke treats sociologists, here of urban poverty, as objects of historical enquiry in 
their own right, while Moritz Föllmer places prominent interpreters of city life such as Henri 
Lefebvre or Michel de Certeau in the context of an emerging left-wing critique of 1960s-style 
modernity. At the same time Föllmer draws on a sociologist, namely Anthony Giddens, with his 
concept of modernity as an interplay between the ‘disembedding’ and the ‘re-embedding’ of 
social relations, to grasp contrasting notions of personal choice and their urban effects. Tim 
Verlaan similarly contextualises the ambiguous attitudes of urban planners towards the times 
they lived in by using Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash’s notion of ‘reflexive 
modernisation’. The assumption underlying both articles is that those sociologies that place 
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complexity and ambivalence centre stage have much to offer conceptually, even to historians 
who are otherwise inclined to treat sociological studies as one particular type of social 
construction. 
 In any case, urban sociology and urban studies offer a wide range of approaches and, 
rather than aiming for any single coherent theory, have rendered the scholarly view of the city in 
Europe and the World much more diverse in recent years.51 In tune with this methodological 
pluralism, the contributors to the present theme issue pursue different lines of enquiry. Reinecke 
historicises sociological and journalistic reports and exchanges, while Verlaan does something 
similar with the interventions and projects of urban planners and Vall studies adaptations of 
housing schemes and architectural designs across national borders. These authors concur in 
holding that urban society has been a matter of construction rather than an independent ‘reality’, 
but that these constructions have had tangible social and spatial effects beyond their written or 
pictorial manifestations. Föllmer similarly focuses on discourses around personal choice and on 
the influence of these discourses on city politics and the order of space. Along the way, he takes 
the reader into 1950s ‘modern’ family flats as well as squatted houses in the 1970s and early 
1980s – an attention to the micro-level of urban societies that also lies at the heart of Dale’s study 
of housing shortages and reconstruction efforts in the post-war decade and of Smith’s exploration 
of company towns, kindergartens and pensions offices. Both the constructionist and the 
microhistorical turn of social history, its focus on the agency of subjects as well as on that of ‘the 
state’ are thus represented.
 Having said this, the present theme issue also leaves some important lacunae, of which 
class, gender and ethnicity are especially glaring. These have to some extent been addressed by 
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other historians of European societies since 1945. Local studies and oral histories of the working 
class have questioned the predominant discourses of the period, which tended either to 
foreground classless consumers and citizens or, in the Eastern Bloc, to expand the scope of 
‘proletarians’ far beyond the industrial labour force.52 Explorations of gender and sexuality have 
fostered a more differentiated understanding of how post-war urban life created new lifestyles for 
many women, perhaps most dramatically (and notwithstanding the double burden of domestic 
and workplace duties) in the heavily industrialising East.53 They have brought out how queer 
minorities established their own networks in public lavatories, bars and private flats,54 or how 
pre-existing areas of sexual entertainment such as Soho in London or St. Pauli in Hamburg 
became more commercialised and sanitised in the course of the 1950s and 1960s.55 In all these 
cases, gender images were intertwined with spatial practices and thus had tangible social effects.
 As for ethnicity, relevant studies have elucidated the interplay between ethnic and social 
stereotypes and spatial marginalisation, for instance in the shantytowns of southern Italians in 
Turin, or in Kracow, where urbane citizens perceived the rural migrants in nearby Nowa Huta as 
hicks.56 Some historians even point to a racial, sometimes violent, underside of urban modernity 
until well into the 1980s.57 Others stress how migrants, albeit slowly and tacitly, became part of a 
new urban normality, through the integrative efforts of some municipal authorities as well as 
their own activities as owners of shops or restaurants.58 Studies of Jewry have shown how the 
surviving members of a minority that had once been such an integral and very visible part of 
many European cities found themselves in a peripheral position during the post-war decades, 
before Jewish culture began to become more visible again towards the end of the twentieth 
century.59 In that sense, to conceptualise urban societies in Europe since 1945 requires us to be 
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aware of absences as well as manifold presences, of social imaginations as well as social 
practices and effects.
 All these aspects and examples suggest, to quote a prominent scholar of American 
history, that contemporary urban historians insist on ‘complex, conflicting, multi-scaled and 
dense processes, relations, and interconnections’ rather than aim to satisfy the frequent ‘quest for 
urban coherence in the study of the city’.60 This said, the quest for urban coherence was a crucial 
and powerful feature of the period and thus needs to be taken seriously as a historical 
phenomenon, even if it was often disappointed in practice. After the severe conflicts of the 
interwar period and the material and societal destruction experienced during the war and its 
aftermath, city dwellers and municipal governments alike strove for pacification and consensus. 
This was ultimately behind many of the continuities and transformations that have been stressed 
in this introduction, ranging from the importance of the nineteenth-century urban past to the 
expansion of social housing. The quest for coherence also explains why the stark ideological 
differences of the Cold War did not always translate into differences of urban design and 
experience, why planners during the 1960s acted more in accordance with popular preferences 
than tends to be acknowledged in retrospect, why ethnic minorities were first marginalised and 
later, if often reluctantly, ‘integrated’ and why the New Left shook up the prevailing urban 
consensus, but its initially radical impulses were soon accommodated and even commodified. 
Such a quest for coherence was if anything more apparent in the cities to the east of the Iron 
Curtain, though the conflict between ideological purity and economic reality made it even more 
vulnerable. It is this interplay between complexity, diversity and resilience on the one hand and 
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the quest for coherence on the other that any history of urban societies in Europe since 1945 
should aim to explore and understand.    
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